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Orchestrated Learning: Creating a Company-Specific 
Production System (XPS) 
Abstract 
Purpose – Companies create company-specific production systems (XPS) by tailoring 
generic concepts to fit their unique situation. However, little is known about how an XPS 
is created. This paper aims to provide insights into the creation of an XPS. 
Design/methodology/approach – A retrospective case study was conducted in a 
Norwegian multinational company over the period 1991–2006, using archival data and 
interviews.  
Findings – The development of the XPS did not start with a master plan. Instead, 
dispersed existing initiatives were built upon, along with an external search for novel 
ideas. Widespread experimentation took place, only later to be combined into a coherent 
approach. Once established, the XPS was disseminated internally and further refined. The 
CEO orchestrated the experimentation by facilitating the adaptation and combination of 
different concepts and by allocating resources to institutionalize the XPS in the global 
network.  
Originality – This paper is the first to study how an XPS is created. Our study contributes 
with novel empirical insights, and it highlights the role of top management in facilitating 
experimentation and step-by-step organizational learning. 
Keywords Company-specific production systems (XPS), Toyota Production System 







Netland (2013) introduced the term “company-specific production system” (XPS) to 
describe how companies create standardized improvement programmes that are adapted 
to their own strategies and environments. An XPS is described as an “own-best-way 
approach to the one-best-way paradigm” of operations management: a strategic and long-
term programme, shared within the global production network, creating a common 
platform for improvement. The central idea of an XPS is to combine and adapt existing 
organization concepts to fit the unique situation of the company. However, neither 
Netland (2013; 2014; 2017; Netland and Aspelund, 2014) nor subsequent empirical 
research on XPS (Boscari et al., 2016; Osterman and Fundin, 2018; 2020) offer any 
analysis of how an XPS comes into being. The same holds for the closely related notion 
of “corporate lean programmes” (Powell and Coughlan, 2020a). Hence, the extant 
literature offers little managerial advice on how to create an XPS, limiting the practical 
applicability of the XPS approach.  
This article responds to these shortcomings by asking:  
 How is a company-specific production system (XPS) created?  
A retrospective case study was conducted in a Norwegian multinational, covering the 
XPS development from the initial phase when the company realized a need to focus on 
production performance, to the final implementation and institutionalization of the XPS 
in the company’s global network.  
The findings indicate that the company managed to create a long-lasting improvement 
programme “meant to sustain the emphasis and focus […] over a long time” (Netland, 
2014, p. 131). The creation process did not follow a master plan. There was no systematic 
evaluation of the company’s uniqueness, and most concepts were tried out based on 
emerging, mostly unrelated, initiatives in the organization. Furthermore, incorporating 
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and adapting the concepts were done through experimentation by different stakeholders. 
Experimentation led to a widespread learning process in different parts and levels of the 
company, lasting for 14 years. After the incubation phase, the learning was orchestrated 
by the CEO, enabling the organization to adapt and combine the concepts, and ultimately 
to integrate a final XPS.  
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to study how an XPS is created. Our 
study contributes novel empirical insights, and it highlights how the process of creating 
an XPS is one of experimentation and step-by-step organizational learning. 
Correspondingly, the role of the top manager is one of orchestrating learning by 
facilitating local experimentation and ensuring that lessons learned are codified and 
disseminated.  
 
Creating an XPS 
Within the existing literature, an XPS is thought to have three main characteristics. 
However, beyond some general assessments in Netland’s work, how these characteristics 
matter for the creation process has barely been addressed.  
First, an XPS is a long-term, strategic programme (Netland and Aspelund, 2014). In 
contrast to temporary improvement projects, an XPS is supposed to be infinite – that is, 
it is intended to “sustain the emphasis and focus across the global operations networks 
over a long time” (Netland, 2014, p. 131). Therefore, the creation of the XPS is done 
centrally in the organization, where the “headquarters offer a shared system for the global 
production network” (Netland, 2014, p. 128). The XPS is also supposed to be supported 
by top management and to bring consistency and durability to improvements in all plants 
within the company. However, the XPS literature does not offer any analysis of the 
content of the top-management support, although it is considered crucial for the 
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programme’s success (Netland, 2013; 2014). Similarly, studies of lean-inspired 
transformation recognize top-management support as a vital factor for the success of such 
transformations, but they have rarely detailed the content of this support (Holmemo and 
Ingvaldsen, 2016; Marodin and Saurin, 2013; Netland et al., 2019). Therefore, top-
management support for the creation of an XPS needs to be examined empirically. 
Second, an XPS combines proven principles from different organizational concepts. 
Although “lean” appears to be the dominant source of inspiration for XPS design, Netland 
pointed out that industry-specific characteristics mean that particular lean elements may 
not be appropriate in a certain industry, whereas “non-lean principles” may be suitable 
(2013, pp. 1092–1093). Despite this conceptual understanding, Netland (2014) 
empirically found that few XPS contain unique, non-lean principles. 
Third, in an XPS, concepts are adapted to a company’s strategies and environments. Not 
all principles suit all companies due to differences in production set-up, plant size, 
technology, organizational culture, and other contingency factors (Hekneby et al., 2021; 
Sousa and Voss, 2008). Netland (2014, p. 129) addressed the issue by giving an example 
of a batch producer of aluminium selecting a production principle of “optimized flow” 
instead of “just-in-time”, because the former is more suitable for a process industry. The 
adaptation of the concept is here related to the production set-up (Hayes and Wheelwright, 
1979). Moreover, with reference to Sousa and Voss (2008), Netland implied that a more 
extensive contingency view should be taken when analysing uniqueness. However, the 
XPS literature gives no precise description either of which variables should be examined 
or of how the tailoring process proceeds. 
The creation of an XPS might resemble how the original Toyota Production System (TPS) 
concept was created, even though the latter often serves as the main inspiration for the 
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former. The TPS was also built on pre-existing concepts, primarily those associated with 
US mass production and with unique Japanese influences, which were combined and 
adapted to fit challenges facing Toyota from the 1930s onwards (Benders, 1998; 
Fujimoto, 1999; Holweg, 2007). The evolution of TPS reveals an extensive and prolonged 
process of experimentation and organizational learning. Its results and insights were 
synthesized into a “production system” only at a relatively late stage of development.  
 
Research Design 
Presentation of case company 
Our study examines Elkem ASA, a Norwegian multinational company. Elkem is one of 
Norway’s oldest industrial companies, with over 100 years of experience within the 
electrochemical process industry. Elkem started out as an engineering company selling 
the Söderberg electrode to the global market. From 1950, Elkem gradually became a 
producer of aluminium, ferroalloys, and later silicon materials, changing the company’s 
focus from technology and engineering to running large-scale production (Sogner, 2014). 
Today (2020), Elkem consists of three business divisions – silicones, silicon products, 
and carbon solutions – and has 31 plants around the world. Elkem’s main production can 
be classified as a highly automated process production with large volumes of standardized 
products. Most of the plants are organized around a single main material flow, which 
diverges mostly in the final phases of the value stream.  
With its origins in Norway, Elkem has adopted values from the Scandinavian working 
life tradition, which is characterized by extensive worker participation and collaborative 
industrial relations (Ingvaldsen, 2013). With its global expansion, including factories in 
China, Brazil and South Africa, the company is exposed to a wide array of national 
cultures and social institutions.  
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In 1990, Elkem was on the brink of bankruptcy. Net income had dropped to an annual 
deficit of 700 million NOK and the company’s debt was more than 6 billion NOK. Elkem 
also struggled with safety and workplace conditions, due to outdated production facilities 
and a lack of strategy for future growth and investments. Indeed, the consensus among 
central Norwegian officials in 1990 was that Elkem belonged to a dying industry and that 
its prospects of survival were poor.  
Today, Elkem is a world-leading company within the electrochemical industry and is 
considered one of the most successful fully integrated silicone manufacturers in the 
world. It has become a global leader in silicon and micro silica, a leading manufacturer 
of special alloys for the steel industry, and a world-leading supplier of carbon materials 
and specialized carbon products. Elkem currently has 6,370 employees worldwide and its 
revenues amount to more than 25 billion NOK (2019). Workplace conditions are 
considered to be of world-class standard, with a rate of only 2.1 injuries per million 
working hours in 2019.  
Within Elkem’s top-management team, the evolution and success of Elkem are often 
traced back to the company’s strategic initiative in the 1990s that involved developing 
the Elkem Business System (EBS), the company’s own XPS (Sogner, 2014):  
We are confident that it was the right choice to develop and implement EBS 
because we have seen the results of our improvement in the company’s KPIs [key 
performance indicators]. Increased production volume, uptime, silicon quality, 
sales volume and, of course, safety. (Top managers, Elkem top-management team, 
2017) 
Hence, according to Elkem, the creation of the XPS was an important contribution to the 
company’s turnaround and business success in the period 1990–2020. 
 
Data collection  
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A retrospective case study (Yin, 2014) was conducted in 2019 and 2020 to capture data 
on how the EBS was created. We used purposive sampling to identify the most central 
people involved in the XPS creation process. Data were collected from four main sources: 
 Interviews with the top managers working in Elkem from 1991 to 2006, including 
the CEO, HR director, the EBS director, and several other managers involved in 
the creation process. 
 Interviews with today’s top-management team at Elkem, including the CEO, HR 
director, division directors, EBS director, and central actors related to the EBS. 
The interviews were followed up with several emails to further investigate the 
themes emerging from our analysis.  
 Four workshops with central actors related to the creation of the EBS.  
 Archival data from EBS educational material from 1990 to 2020, combined with 
observations and participation at the EBS University in September 2017. 
 
In total, 21 interviews were conducted, using a semi-structured approach. Each interview 
lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. Interviews were structured around seven main topics (see 
Table I). Questions were developed based on the main topics in the XPS literature: (1) 
the strategic dimension, including support from top management; (2) concepts in use; (3) 
how concepts were selected, adjusted, and tailored to the company. 
Table I. Interview guide 
Main topic and question Elaborative questions 
Introduction  
Describe your background and relation to 
Elkem and Elkem Business System. 
Background? 
Formal position? 
Experiences with EBS? 
Creation 







Which concepts were used in the creation 
process? 
Origin of the concepts? 
History of introduction? 
Tailoring process 
How were the concepts adapted to the 
company? 
Evaluating company needs? 
How concepts were implemented? 
Impact on the organization? 
Top management 
Describe the role of top management in the 
process. 
Precise description of top management 
support? 
Importance for the creation process? 
Important events or persons 
Are there any important events or persons in 






Is there something important information 
regarding the creation process not 
addressed? 
What is forgotten? 




All interviews were transcribed and, together with the archival data, sorted according to 
the timeline. Elkem created its XPS over a period of 14 years, with different individuals 
bringing in different ideas and concepts. The data were analysed based on Langley’s 
(1999) suggestion to use “temporal bracketing” to understand organizational change 
processes. If there is a certain continuity in activities within a period, temporal bracketing 
might be used to facilitate the examination of how actions in one period change the 
context of action in subsequent periods (Langley, 1999, p. 703). This strategy led us to 
cluster our data in four main, successive phases (see Figure 1). We then analysed the data 
within each phase with respect to three main themes from the literature on XPS: 
 Which concepts contributed to the XPS? 
 How were concepts combined and adapted to company-specific conditions 
and needs? 
 How did top managers support the creation of the XPS? 
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This strategy of data analysis allowed us to build a “process model” (Cloutier and 
Langley, 2020) of XPS creation – that is, a reconstruction highlighting the main events 
and activities, and how they relate. Hence, we could understand how concepts were 
selected, combined, and adapted, as well as top management’s role in the overall process. 
The findings were brought back to and validated by key respondents (Yin, 2014). 
 
Findings 
Introduction and time phases 
To describe the creation process, it seems reasonable to set the starting point as 1991, 
because it was then that a new CEO entered the company, later to become the main 
sponsor of the business system. The XPS emerged in a series of new ideas and 
experimentation over a 14-year period. In 1999, the experimentation ended in 
consolidation and a formal decision to establish the EBS. The final content of the EBS 
was established in 2006, bringing a vital concept of critical process management to the 
final principles and the written material that contributed to the institutionalization of the 
XPS.  
The creation process can be structured into four main phases. Even if there is some 
overlap, each phase represents a different stage in the development (see Figure 1). We 
have labelled these four phases as:  
1) Crisis: the first period mostly stemmed from desperation and a strong focus on 
survival.  
2) Inspiration and experimentation: in this period, Elkem was introduced to several 
new ideas and concepts, inspiring and changing the focus of top management. 
Elkem started to experiment with the different concepts in the different plants and 
divisions, resulting in significant, yet distributed, organizational learning. 
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3) Consolidation: in 1999, Elkem integrated and combined the different concepts, 
and formally established the EBS.  
4) Institutionalization: the final content of the XPS was implemented, and a plan for 
institutionalization was developed. 
In the following subsections, we present each phase in detail. Table II presents an 
overview of the main findings. 
Figure 1. Creation phases of Elkem Business System 
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Phase 1: Crisis 
The first phase of the XPS creation process mostly related to handling a fundamental 
crisis in the company. There was no formal decision to create an overall production 
system; rather, a cost reduction programme was the management’s focus. However, one 
plant began experimenting with a totally different concept, which became a pillar for the 
XPS.  
 
Concepts in use  
In 1991, Elkem consisted of 25 wholly and partially owned production units in Norway, 
Iceland and North America, with approximately 5,000 employees, of whom two thirds 
were in Norway (Aslaksen, 1999). The globalized economic market had developed 
significantly, with newcomers (China and Russia) flooding the western European market 
with low-price products of acceptable quality (Aslaksen, 1999). In the home market, the 
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Norwegian government introduced new power regulations, which forced Elkem to pay 
more for hydroelectric power and led the company to realize that it was unable to utilize 
its production equipment and human resources to the standards required to be globally 
competitive (Aslaksen, 1999). These contextual elements were to become decisive in the 
emergence of the XPS over the following years. 
When a new CEO was appointed in 1991, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy. 
The company had to cut costs, and extensive staffing reduction programme was 
implemented in the early 1990s. The firm relied heavily on consultancies to implement 
cost reduction programmes, to initiate employee reduction, and to sell off assets.  
In parallel, a quite different concept had already been introduced to Elkem in 1990 by an 
action researcher. Working for the Norwegian government to promote modern 
organizational design, she was the first to introduce the sociotechnical systems approach 
(STS) (Trist, 1981), which was combined with Norwegian work-life norms of broad 
worker participation in organizational development (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976; 
Ingvaldsen, 2013). The “Fiskaa plant project” in Kristiansand marked the start of a long-
term collaboration that was to have a decisive impact on the development of Elkem’s final 
XPS. This project was not part of the ongoing cost reduction programme; rather, it aimed 
to develop a participatory work organization and to enhance the internal capacity for 
organic change in order to increase productivity and improve the quality of work-life 
(Aslaksen, 1999). The project required employees to participate in all activities, and there 
was a clear link between the project and the factory’s long-term strategy. The project 
started with a gap analysis and the broad involvement of the organization. Trade union 
representatives, operators, chairmen, representatives from operations and maintenance, 
top management, and various staff members participated. Several groups (task forces) 
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were established, and they were given responsibility for coordinating the improvement 
work between the meetings to ensure active participation throughout the organization.  
Two significant lessons emerged from the project. First, the project demonstrated that an 
alternative work design might be superior. Changes involved using semi-autonomous 
teams and decentralized decision-making for operators (Aslaksen, 1999). This 
contributed to internal discussion and configuration, which related to empowerment in 
the EBS. Several organizational alternatives were constantly discussed and tested 
throughout the 1990s. Second, the project showed that when developing an organization 
and implementing a participatory work design, the set of principles or fixed solutions is 
not sufficient on its own. Because they challenge the plants’ existing power structures, 
the ideas had to be made operational and tested in practice, and arenas for learning (i.e., 
cross-functional teams) across the organization had to be created (Aslaksen, 1999). This 
knowledge of empowerment and practical experimentation was later used to tailor 
different concepts to suit the company’s uniqueness, ultimately becoming the EBS.  
 
Tailoring concepts to meet the company’s needs 
The cost-cutting programme was based on the fundamental need for company survival, 
whereas the STS project was initiated with funding from the Norwegian government. In 
fact, the Fiskaa project was not on the radar of the top manager until 1994.  
Data indicate that the STS concept was not initially tailored to suit the company’s needs. 
The concept was introduced by the Norwegian government as part of its Industrial Sector 
Programme. Responding to the main challenges facing the processing industries in 
Norway, the programme aimed to create a more flexible work organizations, utilize the 
competence of the workforce, and improve the work environment (Aslaksen, 1999). 
Instead of deploying cost reduction actions directed by top management, all parts of the 
plant’s organization were involved in establishing targets and actions (Aslaksen, 1999). 
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An important task within this process was to involve the shop floor in using new sensor 
technology in the production line (Aslaksen, 1999). The knowledge of empowerment was 
later used to tailor the concept of TPS in Elkem’s aluminium division. 
The Fiskaa plant was invited to participate in the programme in 1990. In return, the plant 
had to demonstrate interest among both the employers and the employees in working 
towards increased participation and sharing of their experience with other plants in the 
Industrial Sector Programme. Therefore, the STS concept was selected on the 
recommendation of an external programme rather than as a result of an evaluation of 
whether it was a “perfect fit”. 
 
Top-manager support 
The CEO of Elkem seemed to have little knowledge of the STS initiative at the Fiskaa 
plant until 1994, when he met the action researcher. 
 
Phase 2: Inspiration and experimentation 
In this phase, new concepts inspired the main stakeholders in Elkem to change the focus 
from cost reduction to product quality in order to re-establish trust in Elkem as a profitable 
company. In addition, widespread experimentation with different concepts for improving 
production performance was initiated across the global network. This fuelled significant 
learning within the company. 
 
Concepts used 
In the 1990s, Elkem jointly owned two plants with Alcoa (Lista and Mosjøen). In 1994, 
through collaboration with Alcoa, Elkem’s recently appointed CEO was introduced to 
Alcoa’s XPS, the Alcoa Business System (ABS) (Kolesar, 1993). As early as 1980, Alcoa 
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had begun sending managers and other technical personnel to Japan to learn how 
improvement work should be carried out. The new CEO received direct information from 
Alcoa about their exploration of TPS principles in the process industry, and in 1994 
Elkem sent its first manager to Alcoa to be trained. He returned with a training programme 
and a clear concept of improvement work in the processing industry. The training 
programme created considerable enthusiasm and faith among the managers in Elkem. In 
retrospect, the CEO acknowledges that an important reason why the ideas from Alcoa 
became inspirational was that Elkem’s stakeholders at the time felt a strong sense of 
urgency. Even top management was not convinced that the company could be rescued, 
and there was a lot of negative publicity about Elkem and the wider industry in which it 
operated:  
To be completely honest, the reason that [EBS] became a success was that it came 
out of desperation. Even top management was not convinced that the company 
could be salvaged. (Former CEO of Elkem interviewed in 2019) 
The training programme was, therefore, considered a “rescue package”, and, in 1995, 
Elkem started the process of creating its own training programme, in addition to sending 
more people over to Alcoa to learn about TPS and the basic principles of ABS. 
 
Tailoring concepts to meet the company’s needs 
In the ABS, Alcoa had already begun adapting TPS principles to processing industries. 
Elkem’s decision to adopt the TPS principles was not based on a precise description of 
contextual variables or an assessment of a “perfect fit” between these variables and the 
company. Rather, the TPS principles were introduced based on a strong belief that the 
ABS could work as a “rescue package” at a time of urgent need.  
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The inspiration provided by this new concept might have been related to a broader shift 
in focus that was taking place among manufacturers in this period (Voss, 1995). Shifting 
away from cost-cutting activities, the new focus was on production performance. Taking 
inspiration from the CEO in Alcoa, Elkem adopted the slogan “it’s all about getting the 
processes under control”. This slogan (and its variants) captured the new focus in Elkem 
and its move away from a fundamental low-cost strategy and towards a strategy of high-
quality products:  
It should be understood that this was not about cost and downsizing, but to get the 
process under control. That was the real breakthrough and it had much more 
economic effect than cost reduction. (Former CEO of Elkem interviewed in 2019)  
Alongside the new interest in applying the TPS, further experiments with the STS concept 
were initiated. Here, we discuss three important experiments that took place in this phase.  
 
Experiment 1. In 1994, the action researcher was commissioned for a new project at the 
Bjølvefossen plant by the plant manager. Following the same structure as the Fiskaa 
project, Bjølvefossen began by establishing an innovation team, representing a vertical 
structure of the plant and called the extended management team (EMT). Top 
management, middle managers, division managers, engineers, operators, and the four 
unions were represented in the EMT. First, a gap analysis was conducted, which involved 
analysing external and internal contextual elements, and this was followed by the 
development of a long-term vision for the plant: “becoming a competitive and profitable 
melting plant for strategic customers” (Aslaksen, 1999, p. 100). Four task forces were 
then established, each being responsible for actions and competence development in the 
plant in relation to four areas: market situation, production, technology, and 
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organizational aspects. For example, the technology task force introduced the use of new 
monitoring technology by production operators. Plans for new technological solutions 
were developed, training was integrated into day-to-day operations, and the strategic 
choices were made with broad involvement by the entire organization. The task forces 
reported back to follow-up conferences, at which actions and results were shared and 
discussed in relation to the next integration phase.  
An interesting adjustment was made in the Bjølvefossen project that related to the 
political context of the plant. Between the second and the third follow-up conferences, 
the heads of the four unions had a strong sense of being held as “hostages” in the process 
by Elkem’s management (Aslaksen, 1999). They wanted to discuss this with their 
members and shop stewards. The third conference was then used to bring all the unions 
together, and the plant manager presented the project in detail, thereby involving the 
unions by enabling them to contribute to further development. The outcome was that the 
union heads received a reinforced mandate to continue participating in the project, and 
the shop stewards were given more information about and involvement in the project 
(Aslaksen, 1999). 
 
Experiment 2. Alongside the Bjølvefossen project, TPS principles were tried out in 
Elkem’s aluminium division. Led by the division manager, this project had its own 
trajectory parallel with the rest of Elkem’s organization. Together with several highly 
skilled operators in the two Norwegian plants, the aluminium division became a key arena 
for experimenting with TPS knowledge from Alcoa and adapting the concept to 
Norwegian conditions by removing supervisors from the shop floor and creating semi-
autonomous teams. This was not part of the programme at Alcoa, where a more traditional 
work structure on the shop floor was preferred. This adaptation was made during the 
experimentation, leading to important organizational changes that appear similar to those 
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associated with the STS concept. Notably, in this division STS had never been introduced 
as a concept in itself. Rather ideas of “flat hierarchies” and “semi-autonomous teams” 
entered the division via their broad acceptance as good practices in the Norwegian work-
life culture (Ingvaldsen, 2013) and due to the influence of the parallel projects taking 
place in the Fiskaa and Bjølvefossen plants.  
Elkem’s aluminium division produced raw aluminium, mainly electrochemically and 
often referred to as the “upstream process”; in addition, it also completed and processed 
raw material for specific customer products (the “downstream process”). Alcoa, in its 
collaboration with Toyota, developed two types of improvement programmes for its main 
processes: (1) critical process management, which focused mainly on the upstream 
process; and (2) ABS, which was based on TPS approaches to creating flow efficiency 
and waste reduction in the downstream processes. In 1998, the aluminium division 
established an internal training group consisting of local operators and specialists from 
Alcoa’s headquarters. They became responsible for the experimentation and developed 
the first written material and training programme, which was based on Alcoa’s principles. 
This training programme was named the Elkem Aluminium Business System (EABS) 
and was the precursor to the EBS. The materials described some basic principles that were 
eventually to constitute the basis for all improvement work in the two Norwegian plants. 
The training programme, in its “Rules in Use”, described the relationship between an 
operator’s standardized work process and the rest of the value chain (see Figure 2). 
Operator activity was to be defined in standard operational processes (SOP). The Rules 
in Use then defined how this operation was integrated in the value stream, creating flow 
between all the work processes and finally executing continuous improvement at every 
stage. Rules in Use, originally developed in the aluminium division in 1998, remain part 
of the training in Elkem’s global university programmes today. 
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Figure 2. Alcoa’s ‘Rules in Use’ 
 
 
Initiated by the training group, the principles were implemented in the two Norwegian 
factories and combined with STS ideas. Central to these experiments was a young and 
talented operator, later to become the first head of the global XPS Centre in Elkem. For 
many years, he had been a full-time union representative for the Norwegian Chemical 
Workers’ Association and had been heavily exposed to the STS concept and ideas of 
industrial democracy in the 1960s and 1970s (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976). He had also 
worked with team-based improvement work and Total Quality Management projects in 
other organizations and was able to use many similar methods in the new context. In 1998, 
he and his team started to train production operators to establish self-managed work 
teams. An important task in combining TPS and STS was to prepare the organization to 
eliminate the position of the shift supervisor. The company had found that when TPS 
principles were introduced, operators started to suggest improvements; however, there 
were significant variations in the rate of actual improvements between the different shifts. 
This could, according to the training group, be traced back to the shift managers. As one 
former shift manager explained: 
We were used as a communication channel to communicate the problems in the 
system. Several managers did not take the problems further and then nothing was 
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done about the problems. We then realized that the problem was the managers. 
(Former shift manager Elkem plant, 2018) 
 
Distributing the supervisors’ responsibilities and tasks down to the teams required 
considerable effort to develop team roles and standardize the work processes (i.e., the 
SOPs). The ambition was to create semi-autonomous teams, guided by clear plans, 
defined roles, and standardized operations. In addition, the support chain and assistance 
functions were reshaped to meet the needs of the teams, operating only during the day. In 
parallel, the company implemented tools, such as 5S, Standardized Work, Visual 
Workplace, and Morning Meeting, which were combined with improvement teams led 
by shop-floor operators. During 1998 and 1999, the team-based organization was 
consolidated at the plants. All shift supervisors were removed, and the production line 
formally shifted to a team-based operating mode.  
The results of the improvement initiative in Elkem’s aluminium division from 1997 to 
1999 is presented as a formidable production performance success by Elkem’s top 
management today. It is argued that the processes led to significant increases in product 
quality and a doubling of production in the same period, resulting in significantly higher 
profits. This also contributed to the factories in Alcoa having, for the first time, no 
absences due to injuries over the course of a year; furthermore, the number of employees 
was reduced from 1,700 to 750 across the two factories. Perhaps the most important 
message was that new business areas were created in the downstream processes, securing 
jobs for those who had become redundant during the improvement phase.  
 
Experiment 3. The STS concept was also tested in a third project led by the action 
researcher and directed at the global network. In 1996, the local plants in the global 
network had limited interrelated cooperation, there was a significant “top-down” 
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relationship between the corporate management team (CMT) and local plants, and the 
relationship between the main union and the CMT was strained because of the cost-
cutting programme, resulting in a law suit in 1994 related to the downsizing process in 
one plant (Aslaksen, 1999). Given this situation, the Elkem Management Forum (EMF) 
was established with two main goals: 
1. To create arenas for dialogue, reflection, and learning between the CMT and the 
plant management teams. 
2. To initiate plant improvement processes to enhance global production 
performance. 
The EMF’s participants were all top managers at the plants, in total numbering 100 people 
in 17 management teams spread over 14 locations. The EMT project followed the same 
structure as the projects at Fiskaa and Bjølvefossen. It started by addressing the company 
vision, then the STS methodology was introduced as a tool to analyse and develop the 
organization, after which Elkem’s approach to strategic plant development was 
introduced. This was probably the first time that the STS concept was introduced to all 
Elkem’s managers. The first session ended with the preparation of development activities 
that were to be conducted at each plant and presented in the next session. As at 
Bjølvefossen and Fiskaa, several actions were initiated across the global network between 
the sessions, contributing to enhanced production performance using TPS and STS 
practices. The EMF was evaluated and, in 1998, Elkem’s CMT decided to continue the 
project, initiating a third module of the EMT.  
The experimentation phase primarily dealt with tailoring the ideas from earlier phases. 
We discovered no formal decisions or discussion about evaluating different concepts that 
could best fit the company at that time. On the contrary, decisions were made by different 
stakeholders, based on the belief that Alcoa’s concept could realize the idea of getting the 
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processes under control and create arenas for dialogue and learning. For example, a team 
of Alcoa specialists was brought in to the aluminium division to conduct an initial analysis 
of the performance of the Norwegian plants. This “plant ABS performance audit” resulted 
in a presentation to the Elkem aluminium plant managers, who were immediately 
impressed with the analysis and the action plans for the production lines. This 
demonstration enhanced the willingness to implement the TPS concept, but there was no 
understanding or decision that the concept should be tailored to Norwegian conditions or 
combined with STS.  
Top-manager support 
Based on the data relating to the CEO in this and the following phases, he can be 
characterized as a strong “sponsor”, a description used in Alcoa to address top managers’ 
necessary support in the development of the ABS (Kolesar, 1993). As mentioned above, 
there was a significant amount of desperation among the managers in Elkem in this 
period. The CEO played an important role in creating faith and optimism, gradually 
managing to change the perspective from short-term costs to long-term improved plant 
performance (Aslaksen, 1999). This sponsor approach became important for internal 
stakeholders as well as for external investors and owners, allowing the CEO to create the 
final XPS.  
The CEO can also be described as an “orchestrator” who coordinated the learning 
processes that were taking place. He did not have a master plan for an XPS; rather, he had 
a strong belief that the concepts and the new organizational structures introduced to him 
in this phase would save the company. Importantly, he allowed for experimentation. In 
an interview, the former CEO emphasized that he was himself immersed in a learning 
process in this phase and that the ideas that were developed were not from him, but from 
many different people across Elkem’s global network.  
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We could not have developed the Elkem Business System if [CEO name] had not 
been there. He was the main architect and sponsor of the business system. (Former 
operator and EBS coordinator in Elkem) 
Without the CEO – no Elkem Business System. (Former union leader, Norwegian 
Chemical Workers’ Association) 
One particular event seems to have been important for the CEO in this phase. He met the 
action researcher for the first time in 1994 at a seminar led by the HR department. After 
being informed about the Bjølvefossen project, his first response was: 
If this concept is so fantastic, why isn’t there a “forest of trees growing” in the 
entire company? (Action researcher, quoting the CEO) 
The action researcher then presented the knowledge from the two projects, emphasizing 
the need for a holistic organizational development in which both technological and human 
resources would be developed to improve production performance. The CEO gradually 
came to appreciate the STS concept and decided to hire the action researcher in 1998 as 
head of the HR department.  
The CEO visited the 30 plants across the world twice each year from 1994 to 2000 
(amounting to more than one visit per week to a company plant for six years). In the early 
years of these visits, he began with a formal presentation of the TPS principles that 
stressed the importance of getting the processes under control. Later, from approximately 
1996, he started to join the teams on the shop floor, participating in and observing 
continuous improvement, and experimenting with new organizational forms. In his 
interview, the CEO claimed that this became important for him because it enabled him to 
understand how TPS and STS could be combined at the shop-floor level. Key to this was 
the idea of restructuring the shop-floor organization into semi-structured teams, removing 
the foremen from the shop floor, and defining the role of middle managers and technical 
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personnel as a “help chain” whose aim was to support the value-creating process at the 
shop-floor level (Lean Forum, 2012). 
The ideas [about self-managed teams] did not come from TPS and Alcoa. We 
developed them entirely on our own. This was brand new in our industry and we 
developed this completely ourselves. (Former CEO of Elkem) 
To support the new ideas that were redefining management in the company, the CEO 
decided to shut down administration buildings located outside the plant’s production 
areas. From 1996, plants were instructed to move central administration into the factory 
area, to further strengthen the understanding of managers as being a “help chain”. Plant 
managers and indirect staff were integrated into the production environment, forcing the 
managers to directly participate in the “quest for process stabilisation” (Lean Forum, 
2012). The CEO also decided to relocate all plant board meetings to the factories. The 
first meeting took place in a meeting room, while all others occurred on the production 
floor.  
Most interviewees claimed that the CEO was vital to creating the XPS, particularly in 
relation to the way he dealt with resistance from middle managers (Lean Forum, 2012). 
The CEO was described as persistent and firm in convincing the global management team 
and technical personnel that this was the only right way, and in imparting the message 
that “either you are with us or you are out”. The CEO confirmed this and claimed that 
such persistence was possible because of the strong support from the workers’ union.  
 
Phase 3: Consolidation 
Several meetings were held in 1999 to consolidate the final XPS. One event, in particular, 
seems to have been vital. The results of the experimentation were presented to the 
management team in a meeting in Mosjøen in 1999. The meeting was part of the ongoing 
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Experiment 3, described in the previous section, and it gathered the entire management 
team from all Elkem’s plants. At this meeting, the CEO, together with the other managers, 
formally decided that the Elkem Aluminium Business System should be renamed the 
Elkem Business System (EBS) and that it should be implemented not only in production 
but also across all parts of the global company (logistics, R&D, supply chain, etc.). This 
marked the formal “birth” of Elkem’s global business system and the intention to 
implement it across the entire organization.  
One organizational initiative was vital for the consolidation: the conversion of written 
material from the EABS to the EBS. The EABS programme had developed a substantial 
number of documents. These included brochures on core values, representing the 
principles for production performance in Alcoa (Figure 3): “Make to use”, “Elimination 
of waste”, and “Empowered people”. One important change was made in this meeting, 
reflecting the combination and adaptation of STS and TPS: “Processes in control and 
capable” was added as a central value. “Empowered people” was also regarded as a strong 
value describing desired management behaviour, due to its fundamental recognition of 
employee involvement and participation as the basis for all leadership in the EBS. Today, 
this value is placed in the centre to further emphasize the importance of the people 
dimension in the EBS (Figure 4). 









Phase 4: Institutionalization 
Concepts used 
As mentioned above, Alcoa had an additional training programme within its global 
network that was to be integrated into the EBS. This was called critical process 
management (CPM), a programme that is highly compatible with TPS principles since it 
addresses the ultimate question of how processes can be stabilized and improved (Shah 
and Ward, 2007). What distinguished Alcoa’s second training programme was probably 
the level of detail of the parameters that were measured, the attempted standardization of 
the upstream processes, and the more extensive use of mathematics and statistical analysis 
to define deviations in each period. Metallurgical upstream processes have an extensive 
number of variables that influence the output. For example, characteristics of the raw 
material, such as the moisture level, the diameter, and dust density, crucially influence 
the process and, consequently, the final product. To ensure stable production, these 
variables must first be defined, then constantly measured and monitored. Central to this 
is the organization’s ability to ensure that the variables are identical every time (to 
stabilize them) and then to develop and improve the process (to make it capable).  
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CPM training does not seem to have received a strong focus during the early years of the 
EABS and EBS. But in 2001, the silicon material division in Elkem started to implement 
it more extensively. Despite being exposed to TPS and STS concepts over a long period, 
the silicon material division was still struggling to get the furnaces under control. Division 
managers then started hiring specialists to further develop the knowledge within the 
division. Finally, in 2006, both training programmes were merged into Elkem’s global 
business system. This marked the beginning of the final concept of the EBS.  
CPM knowledge, including a renewed focus on the maintenance and stability of 
machinery, was to have a decisive impact on Elkem’s production and on the legitimacy 
of the final EBS. When the knowledge was established in the upstream processes, it had 
major consequences both for the furnaces and for production. The quality of the 
production increased considerably, and fewer resources were required, but, perhaps most 
importantly, the operators and engineers experienced the furnaces becoming more stable 
and less unpredictable. This directly affected working conditions on the shifts, which 
gradually became calmer and more controlled, with fewer “fire alarms” and other 
interruptions, ensuring that work could be continuous for longer periods.  
 
Tailoring concepts to meet the company’s needs 
The CPM concept was selected and implemented based on a precise evaluation of the 
technological environment in the upstream processes in the electrochemical industry. The 
silicon material division realized that the TPS and STS principles were insufficient to 
fulfil the ambition of getting control of the furnace processes, so they sought a 
complementary concept suitable for the upstream processes. This seems to have been the 
first time since the cost reduction programme that a concept was tailored to address a 





The CEO was not actively involved in implementing CPM in the silicon material division. 
The division manager was the main architect of this process. More importantly, however, 
in 1998 the CEO had appointed the former action researcher as the company’s HR 
director. In close cooperation with her, the CEO allocated resources to institutionalize the 
EBS. First, a global “university” was established, securing a basic understanding of the 
concept in all parts of the organization. The university was based on a vital principle: it 
should have an equal mix of operators, managers, and technical personnel to ensure that 
understanding and knowledge were transferred to all organizational levels. Second, an 
EBS department was established, which was given the responsibility to coordinate all 
future activities of the EBS. Third, a global assessment programme was implemented to 
ensure necessary local adaptation to the concept. Fourth, a global management training 
programme was established. Finally, several XPS coaches were appointed to the different 
divisions; these coaches were responsible for international training and coordination 
between the XPS department and the different divisions. The institutionalization of the 
EBS remains a vital part of Elkem’s global strategy today, and the company continues to 
distribute the content of the EBS to former and new plants across its global network 
(Authors, 2020). The 14-year learning process of integrating the STS concept with TPS 
is visually presented in the training material, which opens with the EBS logo: “The double 

















Apart from studies on the development of the TPS, our research is the first to document 
and analyse the creation process of an XPS. The TPS has become a template for other 
companies to follow. However, our study makes clear that creating an XPS involves much 
more than simply copying the TPS and replacing “Toyota” with the company name. Even 
if the first phase at Elkem is disregarded, it still took almost a decade to develop and refine 
the system, and to create mechanisms to disseminate EBS knowledge at various levels 
within the company. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a design theory 
for an XPS, several observations can be made that would be relevant input for such a 
theory. It is particularly worth emphasizing how the design process is managed: we term 
this process “orchestrated learning”, by which we mean planning and structuring an 
extensive goal-directed experimental learning process. 
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The findings show that the creation of an XPS cannot be modelled as a linear process of 
strategic choice, in which the organization evaluates its external and internal 
environments, decides on a (combination of) concept(s), and then implements that. 
Rather, we interpret the creation of an XPS as a multi-level process of organizational 
learning. Framing the creation as a learning process helps us to be aware of activities and 
tensions that are easily overlooked when emphasis is put on selecting and implementing 
“best practices” (Powell and Coughlan, 2020b, p. 924).  
First, we propose that creating an XPS involves combining “learning from the experience 
of others” with “learning from direct experience” (Levitt and March, 1988). Others’ 
experiences enter as commodified organization concepts (Benders et al., 2019), but also 
through direct linkages with suppliers, customers, or other actors in the same industry 
(dos Santos et al., 2020; Powell & Coughlan, 2020b). The building blocks may be diverse: 
in the case of Elkem, some elements were international in origin, such as the ABS; others 
were national, such as the sociotechnical ideas promoted in the 1990s by the Norwegian 
government. We find that external knowledge was rarely simply adopted at Elkem; rather, 
it was tried out on a small, experimental scale, so that the company generated its own 
experience. As such, external knowledge seemed to trigger internal knowledge 
generation, rather than substituting for it. 
Second, we propose that creating an XPS involves striking a balance between, on the one 
hand, searching out and generating new experience, and, on the other hand, consolidating 
experimental knowledge into a coherent approach to be further disseminated across the 
units (Argote et al., 2020). In the case of Elkem, there was an alternation between local 
experiments and central efforts to revise the XPS content. Hence, the evolving XPS 
concept, with its associated departments, values, and practices, served as a repository for 
the organization’s accumulated experience. By codifying the lessons learned, the XPS 
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practices functioned analogously to how an SOP should function in a learning shop-floor 
environment (Adler and Cole, 1993; Spear, 2004). Furthermore, by explicating values 
and normative commitments, the XPS retained knowledge by infusing it with a deeper, 
cultural meaning (Authors, 2020). Key personnel transferred knowledge by changing 
positions or working through parallel organization structures like the EMF. Although a 
“final” XPS eventually emerged from the convergences of the learning processes, it 
remained flexible enough to incorporate new insights, as shown by the example of CPM. 
The learning dynamics in the case company are similar to accounts of how the original 
TPS evolved (Benders, 1998; Fujimoto, 1999) and even to how some companies transfer 
and adapt their management practices when expanding internationally (Ansari et al., 
2014; Jonsson and Foss, 2011). It also shows a “creative accumulation” pattern of 
organizational learning (Ingvaldsen and Engesbak, 2020), where new concepts and new 
insights come to supplement the old ones, rather than replacing them.  
As Netland et al. (2019) argued, “lean leadership” must be specified in order to be 
meaningful. Likewise, the role of the top manager in creating an XPS and disseminating 
knowledge about it should be clearly outlined. In the case of Elkem, the top manager can 
be considered the conductor of the orchestrated learning processes. His active role started 
in the second phase. He inspired staff members to experiment with ideas that originated 
both from within and from outside the company. New initiatives were allowed to flourish 
in the organization, and at one point some of these were consolidated into the final XPS. 
Furthermore, top management allocated significant resources to secure 
institutionalization, and they created units to maintain, develop, and disseminate the XPS. 
This indicates a key awareness of the challenges of sustaining organizational change 
(Buchanan et al., 2005). 
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Finally, it is worth commenting on the terms XPS and “corporate lean programme”, with 
the latter appearing to have superseded XPS (Netland, 2017; Netland and Ferdows, 2014; 
Powell and Coughlan, 2020a). Netland (2013) pointed out the importance of adapting to 
industry-specific conditions and, in line with that, looking to “non-lean principles” (pp. 
1092–1093). In our case, the latter come to the fore. More generally, the more the 
production processes in an industry differ from convergent repetitive manufacturing, the 
more important it is to look beyond lean (Hekneby et al., 2021). The term “corporate lean 
program” does not acknowledge this, nor does it emphasize the importance of developing 
one’s own system. In line with our position that developing an XPS is more than simply 
copying another XPS, and that an XPS requires an extensive orchestrated learning 
process, replacing XPS by corporate lean risks throwing away the baby with the 
bathwater. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Netland (2013) emphasized that production processes in a processing industry differ from 
the convergent repetitive manufacturing used by car manufacturers, arguing that 
contingent factors matter for the suitability of elements of the TPS and other systems and 
concepts for this sector (see also Hekneby et al., 2021). A possible critique of the EBS, 
or of our account of its development, is that the company’s strategic market positioning 
does not appear to have played a role, and hence that it was not company specific. 
Therefore, the EBS may be relevant for its competitors as well. Nevertheless, the EBS 
may still generate a competitive advantage for Elkem: it may be relatively straightforward 
to imitate another company’s XPS, but it is much harder to get it to work internally by 
instructing and educating staff at all organizational levels.  
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An avenue for future research would be to investigate whether XPS development in other 
companies follows a pattern of similar phases. In our case study, experimentation largely 
preceded evaluation and consolidation; in other contexts, there might be stronger 
elements of a grand design and less room for incorporating learning from local 
experiments.  
Future research could also explore the role of middle managers in an orchestrated learning 
process and their interactions with top managers in that process. Although our study has 
primarily been concerned with the top management, middle managers’ role must be 
adapted accordingly for XPS programmes to be successful (Netland et al., 2019). 
 
Conclusion and Practical Implications  
Creating an XPS is a process of step-by-step organizational learning. Organizations 
would be wise to build on established concepts, create internal arenas for 
experimentation, and incorporate the lessons learned into a final production system to be 
disseminated and institutionalized across the company.  
What are the implications of this study for managers wanting to establish an XPS? First, 
they should appreciate that the process requires significant time, attention, support, and 
dedication. The duration of the EBS development process also implies that there must be 
consistency in top-management support. This may be easily endangered when there are 
changes in top-management positions. Second, top managers should stimulate the 
organization to pick up new ideas and actively build a network for external learning. 
Third, top managers should allow the organization to experiment with different concepts 
before the final content of the XPS is consolidated. Furthermore, they should support 
interaction between key persons and transfer of experimental knowledge vertically and 
88 
 
horizontally in the organization. Finally, top managers need to realize the importance of 
allocating resources for institutionalization of the XPS. The creation process is an 
opportunity for building shared norms in the organization. 
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